Legal
Security
Found a security problem in QuestPump? Please tell us privately first, so we can fix it before anyone misuses it.
This policy covers QuestPump by Pluxia GmbH, a Swiss company. That is the QuestPump add-on for World of Warcraft, QuestPump for Mac and Windows (the desktop app), the QuestPump apps for iPhone, Apple Watch, Android and Wear OS, and this website. It does not cover the game itself or other companies' services.
Where to write
Please report it privately, never in a public issue:
- by email to security@questpump.com, or
- for QuestPump for Mac and Windows, through a private report on GitHub, at github.com/Pluxia-GmbH/questpump. Its code is there too.
What to include
- What is affected: the add-on, the desktop app, a phone or watch app or the website, with its version and your system.
- What someone could do with the problem, and what they would need to do it.
- The steps to reproduce it, or a proof of concept.
- How we can reach you, and whether you want to be named when the fix ships.
Please test only on your own devices and accounts, send no one's personal or health data, and keep the problem private until a fix is out.
What you can expect
- We aim to confirm your report within 5 working days.
- For a confirmed problem we aim to ship a fix, or to tell you our plan, within 30 days.
- We keep you informed while we work on it and agree a publication date with you. If you wish, we thank you by name in the release notes.
Supported versions
- QuestPump for Mac and Windows: only the newest version gets security fixes, and it updates itself. Pluxia GmbH gives it security updates for at least five years after its first public release, and at least until 4 November 2031, whichever is later.
- The add-on and the apps: the newest version in their stores.
How the desktop app's releases are protected
- Signed updates. The desktop app installs an update only after it has checked the update's minisign signature against the public key built into it. The signature also covers the version number, so an old release cannot pass as a new one.
- Mac: the app is signed with Pluxia GmbH's Developer ID and notarised by Apple.
- Windows: the app and its installer are signed in the name of Pluxia GmbH through Microsoft's Artifact Signing.
- A CycloneDX SBOM with every release, one for each build, listing every component in it.
- cargo-deny runs on every change. It checks the code the desktop app depends on for known security flaws (RustSec advisories), yanked versions, licences and sources.
- Releases are built by GitHub Actions from the tagged commit, from a clean build cache.
What the desktop app exposes
- The LAN API on TCP port 8787 on every address of the computer (IPv4 and IPv6), for the paired phone and watch. Every request carries a token and every body is sealed (AES-256-GCM). Both use keys derived (HKDF-SHA256) from the pairing key. The pairing key travels only in the QR code on the computer's screen, never over your home network or the internet. The phone passes it to its own paired watch over the watch's encrypted link. Each body is sealed for its route: it opens only for the request it was sent with, never on another route. A request whose Host header does not name the computer (its address,
localhostor its own.localname) gets the answer 421 and nothing more. One route needs no token:GET /v1/hello. The phone sends a random challenge. The app answers with two short proofs (HMAC-SHA256) over that challenge: one of the install's random id and one of the pairing key. Only a phone that holds both can check them. The answer names no id, no computer name and no port, and no two answers are the same. So a phone finds its own computer when the address has changed, before it sends its token anywhere, and nobody else learns which computer answered. The app accepts connections only from the private network ranges, the computer itself and, over IPv6, global addresses in the same /64 network as the address they reached. On Windows its firewall rule lets in only the local subnet. Refusals are logged at most once a minute per address, for up to 256 addresses in any minute. "New pairing code" in the app ends every pairing. - A Bonjour record, on Windows only:
_questpump._tcpunder the nameQuestPump, the same on every computer, with the computer's.localname, its address and port 8787. Its text record holdstxtvers=2alone, with no id of the install or the pairing key. It is registered through Windows' own DNS Client, which answers for it. The app opens no socket for it. On a Mac the app advertises nothing. - The local socket for tools on the same computer:
helper.sockin the app's data folder on a Mac, and the named pipe\\.\pipe\questpump-helperon Windows. Only the player's own account (and the system) may open it. It accepts no connections from other computers. - Bluetooth, only after the player turns on a heart-rate strap or a walking pad in the app.
- The Game State Integration listener, only after the player has tapped "Ask after each match" for Counter-Strike 2 or Dota 2 in the app: HTTP on the computer itself (
127.0.0.1, a port the app picks), where the game posts the state of its match. The app writes the address and a random token (24 bytes) into the settings file it puts in the game's folder, and it turns away any post without that token, takes at most 64 KiB a post and reads only the match's phase. No other computer can reach it. - Rocket League's Stats API, only after the player has tapped "Ask after each match" for the game in the app, and while it runs: one connection on the computer itself (
127.0.0.1) to the port the game opens. The app only reads from it, only the name of each event, and never sends the game a command. - A port for a racing game's race data, only while that game runs: UDP on the computer itself (
127.0.0.1), at the port the game sends its data to. The app only receives on it and never sends. No other computer can reach it. - A game's own local game client, only while that game runs: requests on the computer itself (
127.0.0.1) to the port the game serves, asking only whether a match is on or over. The app follows no redirect and reads at most 64 KiB an answer. - Outgoing connections: six, all over HTTPS. The updater's requests go to GitHub, where the releases live. The films of the moves come from there too, once for each new set of films, and each film is checked against its SHA-256 digest before it plays. The feedback the player writes goes to questpump.com as one POST, only when the player presses Send in a feedback window, the game's or the app's own. A crash report goes to questpump.com as one POST from the next start after a crash, while the player's "Send crash reports" is on, or when the player presses Send on the page that asks. It holds the app's version, the system and the crash's own lines, with the home folder's name taken out (see Privacy). While the player's "Usage statistics" is on, the app sends questpump.com the anonymous counts of each finished game day, at its first start of the next one or when the day turns while it runs, in POSTs of at most 40 counts each, its own apart from the game's, with no id of any kind (see Privacy). While the player's sync is on, the app sends questpump.com the game's new rows, its own pumps, the characters' sheets and its setup, and takes in what the player's other devices sent. Each part is sealed (AES-256-GCM) with a key derived (HKDF-SHA256) from a secret only the player's devices hold, so the server cannot open it. While the app runs, it keeps one WebSocket open to questpump.com, which only says when another device synced and which of the player's computers an iPhone of theirs follows. While one follows this computer and a game with QuestPump runs, the app also sends questpump.com each state of the game's pump, at most one a second, and after 4 minutes without one a word that the game still runs. Each state is sealed the same way, with a key of its own, so neither the server nor Apple's push service, which carries it to that iPhone's Lock Screen, can open it (see Privacy). It uses no analytics service. The sync's account has no name and no password.
The desktop app never runs as an administrator. On Windows, the firewall rule runs once as an administrator, and so does the right to write into each game folder Windows keeps closed: World of Warcraft's AddOns folder, and the settings folder of a game the player asks to hear after each match, such as Rocket League's. Each runs one command after the player accepts the Windows prompt. Uninstalling removes that firewall rule after one more prompt. Updates never ask for an administrator. Where the player's Mac account cannot replace the app, it says to download the new version instead.
Problems that are being exploited
If someone is actively exploiting a problem in QuestPump, Pluxia GmbH reports it to the EU's single reporting platform, as the EU Cyber Resilience Act asks (Article 14). We also tell the people who use QuestPump what to do.
For tools: security.txt.